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Colloquium Brief
U.S. Army War College,
The National Bureau of Asian Research, and
		

Bush School of Government and Public Service

THE PLA AT HOME AND ABROAD:
ASSESSING THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF CHINA’S MILITARY
Mr. Daniel Alderman
Bridge Award Fellow
The National Bureau of Asian Research
KEY INSIGHTS:
•

•
•

 igns are emerging that the PLA is becoming more confident about its position vis-à-vis Taiwan. At the same
S
time, China believes that a changing international environment requires the Chinese armed forces to have more
diversified capabilities. It is therefore placing relatively more emphasis on developing operational capabilities
for missions other than against Taiwan (e.g., humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, disaster relief,
antipiracy, etc.).
The implementation of Hu Jintao’s “New Historic Missions” also affords the PLA the opportunity to make gains
in some of its traditionally weaker areas, including logistics improvement, defense industry reform, and the
implementation of combined and eventually joint operations.
Through its 2009 Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission, the PLA Navy has shown that it is capable of undertaking
certain types of operations abroad.

Introduction.
More than 70 leading experts on the PLA gathered at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on September 25-27, 2009, for a
discussion on “The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military.” The
conference was conducted by The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), and The George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public
vice
To set the stage, participants sought to understand the PLA’s evolving view of its roles and responsibilities
amid a changing global security landscape. Beginning at home, participants considered the PLA’s relationship
with the Chinese Communist Party; trends in the PLA’s ongoing reforms to informationalize, mechanize, and
otherwise adapt to China’s evolving defense needs; and the PLA’s role in tackling internal security challenges.
From there, participants discussed PLA operations abroad, assessing trends in the pace, scope, goals, and
success of logistics reform and the impact of these reforms on PLA capabilities. In some cases, it is not known
whether the PLA possesses the capabilities to carry out all of the missions it is assigned, while in other areas, the
deficiencies are well-documented. Regardless, significant progress is being made, and the exact pace, scale, and
success of the PLA’s modernization efforts must be assessed.
In order to analyze PLA capabilities, conference participants were tasked to address how the PLA is
determining what types of missions it will undertake, and in doing so, analyze the process by which these missions
are created and assigned. In addition, attendees were asked to disaggregate the PLA’s aspirational goals from its
current capabilities. Finally, in addition to examining how the PLA is employing new operational capabilities at
home and abroad, participants were challenged to assess the PLA’s own measures for improvement.
Conference attendees approached these issues by evaluating individual operational areas within the
Chinese armed forces and by addressing the lessons learned by the PLA during specific operations. In doing

so, participants sought to examine the implications of
the PLA’s current operational capabilities, while also  
forecasting what type of reforms the PLA will likely
pursue in order to improve weaker areas. Research
questions included: How is China’s changing global
security landscape impacting the PLA’s drive to
improve upon its operational capabilities? How
are doctrinal changes within the Chinese military
occurring, and furthermore, how are they driving
the development of new operational capabilities?
What are the recent trends in the pace, scope, and
success of the PLA’s rapidly modernizing support
mechanisms? What are the operational requirements
for international missions such as the Gulf of Aden
deployment, as well as domestic security challenges
such as the Wenchuan Earthquake rescue effort and
domestic stability operations in Tibet and Xinjiang?

Historic Missions,” which include guaranteeing
communist party rule, safeguarding national
development, defending national interests, and
protecting world peace and common development.
In addition, this document also makes reference to
the previously articulated diversified military tasks,
a term thought to reconcile the new historic missions
with the traditional PLA task of winning local wars
under informationalized conditions. Moreover, for
the first time the 2008 White Paper makes specific
reference to the term military tasks other than war
(MOOTW). For the PLA, MOOTW appears to refer
to a broad range of peacetime operations that include
counterterrorism, stability maintenance, disaster relief,
emergency rescue, and international peacekeeping,
among others.
The PLA appears to face several challenges when
implementing the missions to which it is assigned.
The most significant of these challenges include
maintaining focus, managing tensions between
civilian and military leaders, reconciling demands on
the military despite limited funding, and balancing
priorities between MOOTW and conventional
capabilities.
Likewise, China’s civil-military relations also
appear to be in a state of transition during which the
fusion of the civilian and military establishment into
a symbiotic relationship no longer guides China’s
overall political development. Rather, as the PLA has
become increasingly professionalized, and as military
leaders have ceased holding dual roles in both the
civilian and military organs of government, the PLA
retains a less substantial position in domestic politics,
especially on issues outside of the national security
domain. Instead, the PLA appears to be increasingly
autonomous in its decisionmaking on matters of
national defense. Assuming the PLA continues
its rapid pace of modernization, the possibility of
more autonomy for the PLA in defense matters has
tremendous implications for U.S. policy toward Asia.

Selecting Missions: The Operational Implications.
When determining the necessary operational
capabilities for the Chinese armed forces, Chinese
leaders face an increasingly complex security
environment in which the PLA’s principal concern
is to secure the necessary conditions for continued
economic growth. By protecting the Chinese economy,
the PLA must adapt to an expanding number of
missions to address a range of long- and short-term
concerns. Amid this shifting environment, the PLA
seems to assume that a full scale invasion of China is
not likely. Furthermore, immediate threats appear to
be limited to instability on the Korean Peninsula and
the increasingly remote possibility of conflict over
Taiwan. However, because of the negative consequences associated with major conflict, Chinese leaders
must still prepare for this unlikely event. Considering
China’s extensive maritime and land borders, as
leaders assess the long-term prospects for a myriad of
potential state and nonstate adversaries, many of the
PLA’s concerns appear to be fueled by apprehension
over U.S. strategic intent.
Yet when assessing these concerns and the major
implications they have for the PLA’s operational
capabilities, Chinese leaders have also struggled with
the traditional security dilemma of how to modernize
their forces at a rapid pace without raising alarm
within the international community, especially the
Asia-Pacific region. Such anxiety could undermine
the PLA’s principal objective of supporting China’s
continued economic development.
As PLA security concerns have expanded, so too
has the PLA’s official doctrine. China’s 2008 Defense
White Paper reiterates Hu Jintao’s proclaimed “New

Supporting Missions: The Operational Necessities.
The PLA understands that in order to win modern
conflicts or undertake MOOTW activities, it must have
the Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capacity to carry out joint operations in an integrated,
seamless fashion. Evidence suggests that the PLA
currently does not possess the C4ISR capabilities
necessary to conduct joint operations. Beyond this
broad judgment, the exact status of China’s current
C4ISR implementation can be difficult to assess. But
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assuming Chinese accounts of the existence of an
uncoordinated bottom-up implementation of C4ISR
are correct, 2009 appears to be a crucial year for the
PLA as it attempts to carry out an increasing number
of joint training exercises and promote a growing
number of reforms that will allow the PLA to integrate
units that were previously unable to work together in
a coordinated fashion.
Furthermore, concrete steps toward C4ISR
integration include the PLA’s creation of a model
system and a concerted effort to resolve issues of
horizontal integration that arise over the inability
for different IT systems to be used jointly. Assuming
that the PLA implements a top-down approach to
standardizing systems, and assuming that the PLA
can prevent individual units from buying components
that are not compatible with other units, the opportunity exists for the PLA to gain full interoperability
within the next few decades.
As the PLA attempts to turn its theoretical strategies
for military modernization into reality, the status of
reform within China’s defense industry has become
an important metric by which to assess the military’s
current and future operational capabilities. Over the
last 10 years, the PLA has undertaken dramatic reforms
in its defense industry. And, although these reforms
have brought with them a great deal of bureaucratic
infighting, highly successful individual systems have
emerged from this massive reorganization.
Beyond these individual successes, it remains to
be seen how recent reforms aimed at improving the
competitiveness of the Chinese defense industry will
unfold. Moreover, questions remain as to whether
recent reforms can have an impact on China’s bloated
state owned defense industry in the burgeoning areas
of shareholder reform, competitive bidding, and
privatization. Although little evidence points to major
breakthroughs in these areas, it now appears that
some defense contracts are being awarded through a
competitive process, and government leaders appear
to be increasingly ready to allow the defense industry
to utilize market forces to raise funds for their
development.
In addition to C4ISR and defense industry reform,
the PLA has also come to the conclusion that without
significant improvements to its logistics support
capabilities, it will not be able to carry out the missions
for which it has been tasked. Clearly, the Chinese
military logistics system has made significant progress
in recent years. However, the PLA still has many
operational challenges to overcome, and the ability
to integrate logistics improvements across military
regions and draw upon existing civilian logistics

systems will dictate the pace at which improvements
continue.
Furthermore, the PLA’s focus on improving its
ability to sustain units abroad was also evident this
past year during the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) involvement
in a Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission. Following this
mission, the PLA will likely continue to pursue logistics improvements aimed at more effectively undertaking missions at distance. Within these improvements,
joint logistics will likely be a high priority. Finally,
on the controversial subject of PLA logistics abroad,
debate continues over whether the PLA will pursue
overseas basing rights. In the near term, China may
make expanded use of commercial interests to secure
access for logistical support abroad.
Undertaking Missions: The Operational
Requirements.
As a result of the expanded pace and scale of
its domestic and foreign activities, opportunities to
improve PLA operational capabilities have emerged.
On the domestic front, the PLA has recently been
called upon to cooperate with the People’s Armed
Police (PAP) to provide MOOTW support during
disaster rescue and relief operations in the snow
and ice emergency of January/February 2008 and
the Wenchuan earthquake of May 2008. During
these emergency situations, significant operational
deficiencies were revealed. Such weaknesses included
legal restraints, organizational failures, and the
inability to provide satisfactory mobilization for the
forces necessary. Furthermore, the PLA’s participation
in these events appears to have stimulated debate on
whether focusing on MOOTW might distract the PLA
from its primary mission of national defense.
In addition to environmental disasters, the PLA
also responded to domestic mass uprisings in Tibet
in March 2008 and Urumqi in July 2009. During the
Tibet incident, the PLA’s primary role appears to
have been logistical support. However, during the
turbulence in Urumqi, it appears that the PLA took a
more active role in restoring order. Based upon these
two incidents, it appears evident that the PLA and
PAP can work in unison to restore order following
mass incidents. Furthermore, as a general principle,
it appears that the PLA’s and PAP’s training and
equipment are satisfactory for these roles. And, while
the PLA has not published widely on what lessons it
learned from these incidents, it does appear that its
response to these events revealed deficiencies within
military intelligence, civil-military integration, and
PLA/PAP mobilization.
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On the international front, the PLAN undertook
unprecedented actions abroad during its antipiracy
deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The motivations
and preparations for this mission were based on
China’s assessment that there was a genuine threat
to Sea Lines of Communication in the Gulf of Aden.
Furthermore, this mission has allowed the PLAN to
prove its operational capability to deploy forces far
from Chinese shores. Evidence for this improvement
includes the PLAN’s ability to keep a ship underway
for over 60 days, provide logistics support over a long
distance, undertake at-sea replenishment and refueling, and participate in port visits. Also, the PLAN was
able to improve its satellite tracking and communication skills, as well as enhance its coordination
mechanisms with foreign navies. This mission also
portends the possibility of future rapid PLAN improvement in the areas of equipment, personnel, and
logistics.
The PLA has also participated in an increasingly
wide variety of ground exercises with foreign forces.
Since October 2002, the PLA has participated in 24
such exercises, the vast majority of which were focused
on nontraditional security issues. These exercises
have largely focused on antiterrorist capabilities,
but also other operational capabilities that the PLA
has sought to improve to include disaster relief,
humanitarian assistance, antidrug smuggling, border
security, and emergency response. Although the PLA
seems to recognize that such nontraditional exercises
may not contribute directly to traditional warfighting
capabilities, the PLA leadership appears to have
determined that the benefits of their participation
merit attention, and that some types of nontraditional
training can lead to improved conventional operational
capabilities.
One final area in which the PLA’s operational
capabilities are evolving and improving is in the
area of military-to-military diplomacy. These
diplomatic efforts appear to include steps to reassure
other countries about the peaceful nature of the
development of the PLA’s operational capabilities,
to improve China’s image as a responsible member
of the international community, to garner technological knowhow from foreign militaries, and to deter
threats from outside forces by displaying the PLA’s
strengths. China’s use of military diplomacy manifests
itself in several ways, the most notable of which are
high level exchanges such as strategic dialogues and
consultations; enhanced public diplomacy efforts
through military attaché offices; and the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) website maintained by the MoD’s
new Information Office. In addition, the PLA also

participates in what have been labeled functional
military exchanges that include making PLAN port
calls, participating in combined exercises, sending
foreign observers to outside exercises, committing
to peacekeeping operations, and participating in the
Gulf of Aden antipiracy mission.
Conclusion.
The Chinese military has entered a period of
great transition. As this transition unfolds, signs are
emerging that the PLA is becoming more confident
about its position vis-à-vis Taiwan, more willing to
undertake certain types of missions abroad, and more
capable of undertaking modernization efforts aimed
at logistics improvement, defense industry reform,
and implementation of joint operations. Moreover,
China’s civil-military relations and official doctrine
are undergoing a period of adaptation. In forecasting
how these developments have affected the PLA’s
operational capabilities, recent activities at home
and abroad have shown signs of both progress and
frustrations. The PLA is clearly seeking to improve
its operational capabilities; however, its ability to
overcome significant deficiencies will dictate the
scope, scale, and success of future modernization
efforts.
*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
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This colloquium brief is cleared for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
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